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Introduction
This article examines the differences between American law and International
Human Rights law to determine whether freedom from domestic violence should be
considered a basic human right and whether new law is needed in the United States to
protect that right. Part I looks at the U.S. Supreme Court case Castle Rock v. Gonzales, in
which the Supreme Court held that although Jessica Gonzales had a restraining order
against her husband, the Colorado police could not be held liable for Mr. Gonzales
kidnapping his three daughters or for their consequent deaths. The Court held that the
government is generally not responsible for the violence of private actors; even though
Ms. Gonzales had a court issued restraining order against her husband and had reported
the kidnapping to the police multiple times, the Supreme Court found that she did not
have a procedural due process right to the enforcement of her restraining order.
Part II of this article examines international cases that are similar to the Gonzales
case, in which international courts have found that a government’s failure to protect
citizens from known private threats of violence violates their basic human rights. After
losing in the U.S. Supreme Court, Ms. Gonzales took her case to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, which is an international court of human rights, where
she successfully sued the United States; this case is examined in Part III.
Part IV of this article then looks at the global impact of the Gonzales decision at
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by examining a Kenyan case in which
Kenyan police were found liable for neglecting, omitting, refusing, and otherwise failing
to conduct prompt, effective, and professional investigations into the rape and defilement
of over 160 young girls throughout Kenya.
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Part V of this article then examines ways in which local cities throughout the
United States have responded to the Gonzales decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
deviation from international human rights standards, by enacting local ordinances and
statutes declaring that freedom from domestic violence is a basic human right. Lastly,
Part VI considers possible solutions to the failure of the federal government to recognize
that domestic violence should be considered a violation of the most basic human rights.
Part I – Castle Rock v. Gonzales

In the 2005 Supreme Court case Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, Jessica
Gonzales had obtained a restraining order from the state of Colorado against her abusive
husband.1 The restraining order required that he remain at least 100 yards away from the
home where his wife and three daughters resided. Mr. Gonzales was, however, permitted
to take the children to a dinner once a week at an agreed upon visitation time.2 Several
weeks after the order was issued, Mr. Gonzales took his daughters while they were
playing outside the home without notifying his wife.3 Throughout the evening, Ms.
Gonzales called the police multiple times seeking assistance in locating her daughters,
ensuring their safe return, and enforcement of her restraining order.4 However, the police
took virtually no action, despite the fact that Mr. Gonzales later called Ms. Gonzales to
inform her that he had the children with him at an amusement park in Denver, Colorado.5
At approximately 3:20 AM the following morning, Mr. Gonzales pulled up to the Castle
Rock police station and began firing shots at officers. A shoot-out ensued, after which the
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Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748.
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bodies of Jessica Gonzales’s three daughters were found in the back of Mr. Gonzales’s
truck, riddled with bullets.6
Jessica Gonzales sued the Town of Castle Rock under the Due Process Clause of
the 14th Amendment, which provides that a state may not deprive a person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.7 In order to have a claim under the Due Process
Clause, an individual must have a property interest in police enforcement of the
restraining order; Ms. Gonzales argued that she had such an interest. As the Supreme
Court stated, to have a property interest, “a person (1) must have more than (a) an
abstract need or desire, or (b) a unilateral expectation of a property interest; and (2) must,
instead, have a legitimate claims of entitlement to the interest.”8 The Supreme Court also
noted that “[p]roperty interests are not created by the Federal Constitution… they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law.”9 In this case, the applicable state law from
which Ms. Gonzales claimed her property interest arose was Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6893.5(5) (1999).10
The restraining order obtained by Jessica Gonzales pursuant to the Colorado
statute included preprinted language that directed a peace officer to use “every reasonable
means” to enforce a restraining order.11 However, the Supreme Court held that this did
not make enforcement of the restraining order mandatory for the following three reasons.
First, a well-established tradition of police discretion had long coexisted with apparently
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mandatory arrest statutes. Second, it would be hard to imagine that a police officer would
not have some discretion to determine that, despite probable cause to believe that a
restraining order had been violated, the circumstances of the violation or the competing
duties of that officer or that officer’s agency counseled against enforcement in a
particular instances. Lastly, the practical necessity for discretion was particularly
apparent in a case such as the case at hand, where the suspected violator was not present
and his whereabouts were unknown.12 Furthermore, the applicable Colorado state statute
being interpreted by the Supreme Court provided that “a peace officer arresting a person
for violating a restraining order or otherwise enforcing a restraining order is not to be
held civilly or criminally liable unless he has acted in bad faith and with malice or has
violated the rules adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court.”13
Because of their reading of these statutes, the Court held that Jessica Gonzales
had no constitutionally-protected property interest in the enforcement of her restraining
order, and was therefore unable to claim that the Castle Rock police department had
violated her right to due process.14 To have a property interest in a benefit as abstract as
enforcement of a restraining order, “a person clearly must have more than an abstract
need or desire and more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”15 The Colorado statute created no such clear and
explicit entitlement.
Part II – International Cases Finding State Liability
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Contrary to the Supreme Court’s repeated rulings that the United States
government has no duty to protect individuals from private violence16, many international
courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, have found that states are liable for
failure to protect individuals from private violence. There are two requirements to find
states legally responsible for such failures: 1) the State “knew or ought to have known of
a situation presenting a real and immediate risk to the safety of an identified individual
from the criminal acts of a third party,” and 2) the State “failed to take reasonable steps
within the scope of its powers, which might have had a reasonable possibility of
preventing or avoiding the risk.”17
A. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras
Several other cases heard by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) and committees for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) have found other States to be liable for the
failure to protect citizens from a clear risk of private violence. One such case is Velásquez
Rodríguez v. Honduras, which was heard before the IACHR in 1988.18 This case
involved the kidnapping and disappearance of approximately 150 people in Honduras
who were considered by the State to be dangerous to national security.19 However,
Honduran officials either denied the disappearances entirely or claimed that they were
incapable of preventing or investigating them.20

See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
Caroline Bettinger-López, Human Rights at Home: Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Violation, 40
Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 19 (2008).
18
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, 36 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1913, 1919 (2014).
19
Velásquez.
20
Id.
16
17
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The IACHR found in this matter that Honduras had violated many articles of the
American Convention on Human Rights.21 First, Honduras violated Article 4, which
ensures the right to life, because “the practice of disappearances in Honduras often
involved secret executions and concealment of bodies, [which] is a flagrant violation of
the right enshrined in Article 4.22 The Commission also found a violation of Article 5,
which ensures the right to humane treatment, because investigations into the forced
disappearances, as well as testimony from victims, suggested that the victims were
usually subject to “cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment during their detainment.”23
Lastly, the Commission found a violation of Article 7, which ensures the right to personal
liberty, because “the kidnapping of a person is an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and an
infringement of the right to be brought without delay before a judge….”24 The
Commission awarded reparations in the form of both pecuniary damages and continued
investigation into the fates of those who disappeared.25
B. A.T. v. Hungary
Another case finding State liability is A.T. v. Hungary, a case heard by a CEDAW
committee.26 The petitioner, A.T., had been subjected to severe domestic violence by her
common law husband and the father of her two children.27 However, she did not go to a
shelter because one of her children had severe brain damage that a shelter would not be
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Id.
Velásquez, at 1919-20.
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equipped to handle.28 In proceedings regarding the husband’s access to the family home
following the petitioner’s decision to change the locks to prevent him from gaining
access, the district court found in his favor, and the decision was upheld by the Budapest
Regional Court on appeal.29 Petitioner then instituted criminal proceedings against her
husband, which were unreasonably prolonged.30
Therefore, Petitioner later sued the State of Hungary, alleging that it had “failed to
provide effective protection from her… husband, neglecting its ‘positive’ obligations
under the [CEDAW] Convention and supporting the continuation of domestic violence
against her.”31 She also argued that the lengthy criminal proceedings against her husband,
the lack of protection and/or restraining orders under current Hungarian law, and the fact
that her husband had not spent any time in custody constituted violations of her rights
under the Conventions on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women.32
In its decision, the Committee held that a delay of over three years in criminal
proceedings amounted to an “unreasonably prolonged delay,” especially considering the
fact that the petitioner had been at risk of irreparable harm, had received threats to her
life, and had no possibility of obtaining temporary protection from a restraining order
while the proceedings were in progress.33 The Committee noted that “States may also be
responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of

28

A.T. v. Hungary, Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women under
article 7, paragraph 3, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Thirty-Second Session, at 2 (2005).
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A.T. v. Hungary (Communication No. 2/2003), United Nations Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, at 1 (2005).
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rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence….”34 On this basis, the Committee
found that Hungary had failed to fulfill its obligations under the CEDAW Convention,
and had therefore violated the rights of the petitioner.35
C. Goekce v. Austria
A domestic violence case involving the State of Austria was brought before the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in
2007.36 Goekce v. Austria was brought by two Austrian organizations, the Vienna
Intervention Centre against Domestic Violence and the Association for Women’s Access
to Justice, that protect and support victims of gender-based violence.37 A former client of
the Intervention Centre and victim of domestic violence, Şahide Goekce, was shot and
killed by her husband in front of her children.38 The police had denied two previous
requests that her husband be detained despite the fact that they knew he owned a handgun
and that he had threatened to kill his wife on several occasions.39

34

A.T. v. Hungary, at 11.
Id, at 12.
36
Goekce v. Austria, Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Thirty-Ninth Session, at 1 (2007).
37
Goekce, at 1-3.
38
Id, at 4.
39
Id, at 3.
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The complaint argued that the State of Austria violated Articles 140, 241, 342, and
543, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women for failing to take “all appropriate measures to protect Goekce’s right to personal
security and life.”44 The complaint also alleged that the State had failed to treat Mr.
Goekce as a violent and dangerous offender in accordance with criminal law.45
Furthermore, the complaint asserted that the Austrian Federal Act for the Protection
against Violence within the Family did not provide adequate means to protect women
from highly violent persons, especially in cases of recurrent violence and death threats.46
Lastly, the complaint noted “that women are far more affected than men by the failure of
public prosecutors to take domestic violence seriously…. Women are also
disproportionately affected by the practice of not… punishing offenders in domestic
violence cases appropriately.”47

40

Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) provides:
“For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against women’ shall mean
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.”
41
Article 2 of the CEDAW Convention provides:
“State Parties [must] condemn discrimination against women in all its forms… [by refraining]
from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public
authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation… [by taking] all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or
enterprise… [and by taking] all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against
women….”
42
Article 3 of the CEDAW Convention provides that “States Parties shall take… all appropriate measures,
including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of
guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms….”
43
Article 5 of the CEDAW Convention provides that States take all appropriate measures “[t]o modify the
social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices… which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes….”
44
Goekce, at 5.
45
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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The Committee first noted that “[u]nder general international law and specific
human rights conventions, States may… be responsible for private acts if they fail to act
with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of
violence….”48 The Committee found that Austria had violated Şahide Goekce’s rights to
life and physical and mental integrity under Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Convention.49 Its
findings were based on the fact that the police knew or should have known that Goekce
was in serious danger, particularly because her husband had shown that he had the
potential to be a very dangerous and violent criminal.50 Therefore, the Committee held
that the Austrian police were accountable for failing to exercise due diligence to protect
Goekce.51
D. González, Monreal, and Monárrez v. United Mexican States
In 2009, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights both filed and heard a
case against Mexico for the disappearance and murders of three women– González,
Monreal, and Monárrez .52 The murders had occurred in the city of Juárez, a border town
between the United States and Mexico where gender-based violence, including the
abduction, rape, and murder of young women was a regularity in the 1990s.53 The bodies
of these three women, two of whom were minors, had been discovered in November
2001 in a cotton field known as Campo Algodonero.54 The IACHR found that Mexico
had violated its human rights obligations under the American Convention of Human

48

Goekce, at 21.
Id, at 22.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Campo Algodonero: Claudia Ivette González, Esmeralda Herrera Monreal and Laura Berenice Ramos
Monárrez v. United Mexican States, Organization of American States– Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (2007).
53
Campo Algodonero, at 13.
54
Id, at 7-8.
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Rights including the right to life under Article 4, the right to humane treatment under
Article 5, and the rights of the child under Article 19.55 The Commission ordered Mexico
to satisfy several remedial measures including– the construction of a national memorial,
renewed investigations into the disappearances of the women, reparations of over
$200,000 to each of the families, and the prevention of any recurrence of similar human
rights violations through the use of coordinated policies and resources “to guarantee that
cases of violence against women are adequately prevented, investigated, and
punished…”56
E. Summary
All of these cases involved the failure of governments to make reasonable efforts
to protect their citizens from known threats of violence. Furthermore, in all of these
cases, sovereign States were held liable in international courts for their failure to protect
citizens from the violence of private actors. In the Velásquez case, Honduras was held
liable for the disappearance of 150 people.57 In A.T. v. Hungary, a CEDAW committee
found that a three-year criminal proceeding constituted an unreasonable delay, especially
given the fact that restraining orders were unavailable in Hungary to provide temporary
relief to a battered woman during criminal proceedings.58 In the Goekce case, Austria was
found liable for the death of Ms. Goekce after failing to respond to her requests that her
husband be detained for threatening to kill her.59 Lastly, in the Campo Algodonero case,

55
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Id, at 21.
57
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Communication No. 2/2003, at 2.
59
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Mexico was found liable for failing to prevent and investigate the regular abduction, rape,
and murder of young women in the city of Juárez throughout the 1990s.60
Despite these international cases, the U.S. government has found no duty to
protect individuals from private violence, even where there was a clear threat and an
opportunity for law enforcement to act to try to avoid harm.61 In the Supreme Court case
DeShaney v. Winnebago, a father had been under investigation by the Winnebago County
Department of Social Services (DSS) for child abuse. However, the county did not
remove the child from the father.62 When the father later beat the his son so severely that
he was deemed to be profoundly retarded, the boy and his mother brought a substantive
due process claim, alleging that the county DSS had deprived the boy of his liberty by
failing to intervene and protect him against a risk of violence of which they knew or
should have known.63 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding:
Nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a state to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against
invasion by private actors. The Due Process Clause is phrased as a limitation on a
state’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and
security…. Its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative
obligation on the state to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through
other means. Like its counterpart in the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prevent government from abusing
its power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.64
These differences between American law and International Human Rights law raise the
question– Should American law include the right to freedom from domestic violence in
light of international human rights norms? When the Jessica Gonzales finally appealed
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Campo Algodonero.
See generally Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). See also DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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her case to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission issued a
verdict against the United States, finding that freedom from domestic violence should be
considered a basic human right.65
Part III – Gonzales at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
In 2011, Jessica Gonzales (now Lenahan) sued the United States at the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights after failing to find relief from the United
States Supreme Court.66 Ms. Lenahan’s counsel, who included the American Civil
Liberties Union, argued that the United States had violated the American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man67 by failing to exercise due diligence to protect Jessica
Lenahan and her daughters from domestic violence.68 The petitioner further alleged that
the state of Colorado never duly investigated the killing of Ms. Lenahan’s daughters in
order to clarify the circumstances of their deaths and that the United States government
did not “provide her with an adequate remedy for the failures of the police.”69 Although
eleven years had passed since the passing of Jessica Lenahan’s daughters, she still did not
know the cause, time, and place of their deaths.70
The IACHR found that the United States had violated its obligations as a
signatory of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.71 First, the
Commission concluded that by issuing a restraining order, the state recognized the
necessity to protect Ms. Lenahan and her daughters, but it failed to fulfill this duty with

65

Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al v. United States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Report No. 80/11 (2011).
66
Lenahan, at 1.
67
The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man was the world’s first international human
rights treaty and was adopted by the nations of the Americas in Bogotá, Colombia in 1948.
68
Lenahan, at 1.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id, at 43.
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due diligence: “The state apparatus was not duly organized, coordinated, and ready to
protect these victims from domestic violence by adequately and effectively implementing
the restraining order at issue…”72 The Commission found that this failure was a violation
of Article II of the American Declaration, which ensures equal protection and nondiscrimination, because there had been a historical problem with the enforcement of
protection orders by police73– a problem that has disproportionately affected women.74 In
finding an Article II violation, the Commission underscored “that all States have a legal
obligation to protect women from domestic violence: a problem widely recognized by the
international community as a serious human rights violation and an extreme form of
discrimination.”75
The Commission further found that the failure of the United States to adequately
organize its state structure to protect women and children from domestic violence also
constituted a violation of Ms. Lenahan’s daughters’ right to life under Article I, and their
right to special protection as children under Article VII of the American Declaration.76
The Commission noted that because children have a right to special protection under
Article VII, States have a duty to apply due diligence and to act expeditiously to protect
children from right to life violations; this requires “that the authorities in charge of

72

Lenahan, at 43.
Id, at 43. See also, U.S. Department of Justice Attorney General’s Task Force on Domestic Violence:
Final Report, at 8 (noting that the problem of family violence in the United States has existed for
generations but has only recently begun to receive the attention it deserves) and pages 18-19
(recommending that family violence should be recognized and responded to as a criminal activity, and that
law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges should develop coordinated responses to family
violence) (1984).
74
Lenahan, at 43. See also, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime
Victimization Survey, at 6 (noting that of about 623,000 violent crimes committed by an intimate partner in
2007, 554,000 were against female victims while only 69,000 were against male victims; the number of
female victims was about 8 times that of male victims) (2007).
75
Lenahan, at 44.
76
Id, at 44.
73
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receiving reports of missing persons have the capacity to understand the seriousness of
the phenomenon of violence… and to act immediately.”77
In the Gonzales (Lenahan) case, the police appear to have assumed that the girls
would be safe because they were with their father. However, there is extensive
international recognition of the link between domestic violence and fatal violence against
children committed by parents that the Colorado police officers should have been aware
of.78 The Commission found no protocols and/or directives in place to guide the Colorado
police officers on how to respond to missing children in the context of protection orders
and domestic violence.79
Lastly, the Commission found that the United States had violated Article XVIII of
the American Declaration, which provides that all persons are entitled to judicial
remedies when they have suffered human rights violations:80
The Inter-American has affirmed for many years that it is not the formal existence
of such remedies that demonstrates due diligence, but rather that they are
available and effective.81 Therefore, when the State apparatus leaves human rights
violations unpunished and the victim’s full enjoyment of human rights is not
promptly restored, the State fails to comply with its positive duties under
international human rights law.82
77

Id, at 44. Citing, Campo Algodonero, at 62 para. 285 (ordering the Mexican State to strengthen its
institutional capacity to fight the existing pattern of impunity regarding cases of violence against women in
the city of Juárez “through the use of effective criminal investigation that receive a consistent judicial
follow-up, thus guaranteeing adequate punishment and reparation”) (2007).
78
Lenahan, at 44-45. Citing the United Nations Study on Violence Against Children (which confirms that
the most violence acts against children are usually carried out by people they know and should be able to
trust, such as parents), available at http://www.unviolencestudy.org/.
79
Lenahan, at 45.
80
Lenahan, at 46. Citing, Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report
No. 54/01, para. 37 (2000).
81
Lenahan, at 46. Citing, Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendatriz, et al. v. United States, Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 81/10, para. 62 (holding that it is a fundamental role for the
courts of a state in ensuring and protecting basic human rights and concluding “that when a state fails to
provide an adequate and effective remedy to a violation of a fundamental right under the American
Declaration, that deficiency creates an independent violation of the right to judicial protection under Article
XVIII of the American Declaration”) (2010).
82
Lanahan, at 46. Citing, Organization of American States– Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, Access to Justice for Women Victims of Domestic Violence in the Americas, at 11 para. 26
(providing that a “State’s duty to provide judicial remedies [to victims of domestic violence] is not fulfilled
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Due to the fact that the United States did not provide Jessica Lenahan with an effective
judicial remedy for the non-enforcement of her protection order or a diligent investigation
into the deaths of her daughters, the United States violated Article XVIII.83
According to the Inter-American Commission, “gender-based violence is one of
the most extreme and pervasive forms of discrimination, severely impairing and
nullifying the enforcement of women’s rights.”84 In this vein, the international and
regional systems have noted the strong link between discrimination, violence, and due
diligence, and have therefore determined that “a State’s failure to act with due diligence
to protect women from violence constitutes a form of discrimination, and denies women
their right to equality before the law.”85 These principles of international law have even
been applied to hold States liable for failures to protect women from domestic violence
by private actors;86 this is in direct opposition to the Supreme Court holdings in
DeShaney and Gonzales, which held that the State does not have a duty to provide
services to the public for protection against private actors.87 Since domestic violence has
been recognized at the international level as a human rights violation that is one of the

merely by making those remedies available to victims on paper; instead, those remedies must be adequate
to remedy the human rights violations denounced”) (2007).
83
Lenahan, at 47.
84
Id, at 30. Citing United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, General
Assembly Resolution 48/104 (expressing concern that violence against women is an obstacle to the
achievement of equality, development, and peace; affirming that violence against women constitutes a
violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women; recognizing that violence against women is a
manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which has led to
domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement
of women; and recognizing that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which
women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men) (Dec. 20, 1993).
85
Lenahan, at 30. See generally, CEDAW Committee, Communication 2/2003, Ms. A.T. v. Hungary (Jan.
26, 2005); IACHR, Report No. 28/07, Claudia Ivette González and Others (Mexico) (Mar. 9, 2007); I/A
Court H.R., Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico (Nov. 16, 2009).
86
Lenahan, at 30. See generally, IACHR, Report No. 54/01, Maria Da Penha Maia Fernandes (Brazil)
(April 16, 2001).
87
See generally, DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189.
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most pervasive forms of discrimination, why has the United States, as a leader in the
international community, failed to also make this recognition and to assume the
responsibility of diligently protecting its citizens from domestic violence?88
Part IV– Domestic Court Finding State Liability
Just one year after the Lenahan decision, the equality effect, an international nonprofit organization committed to women’s and girls’ human rights issues, initiated the
“160 Girls” project in Kenya.89 The purpose of the project was to hold Kenyan police
accountable for their failure to enforce defilement90 laws and for neglecting their duty to
protect girls in Kenya from this egregious form of violence.91 The initiative was known
as the “160 Girls” project because at the time of its inception, Ripples International, a
plaintiff in the case, had rescued over 160 defilement victims who needed access to
justice.92
The incidence of rape in Kenya had reached epic proportions by 2011. Statistics
show that every thirty minutes, a girl/women was raped in the country.93 Furthermore,
young girls were especially vulnerable, with nearly one in three Kenyan girls between the
ages of thirteen and twenty-four having experienced sexual violence.94 The petitioners of

88

Lenahan, at 30. Citing United Nations General Assembly, Elimination of Domestic Violence against
Women, U.N. Doc. A/Res/58/147 (Feb. 19, 2004).
89
Fiona Sampson and Sasha Hart, “160 Girls” Making Legal History: Overview of the Development and
Implementation of a Strategic Equality Initiative to Achieve Legal Protection from Defilement for All Girls
in Kenya, at 1 (2014).
90
Section 8 of Kenya’s Sexual Offenses Act of 2006 criminalizes “defilement,” providing, “A person who
commits an act which causes penetration with a child is guilty of an offence termed defilement.” The Act
also provides recommendations for the appropriate length of imprisonment based on the age of the child
defiled. Section 40 of the Act also provides that it is up to the sole discretion of the Attorney General as to
whether police investigations should be discontinued.
91
Sampson and Hart, at 2.
92
Id.
93
Report of the IPU Kenya Delegation on 111th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union held in
Geneva, Switzerland, at 4720 (2004).
94
United Nations Children’s Fund Kenya Country Office, Division of Violence Prevention, National
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the “160 Girls” case had all been victims of defilement, as well as other forms of sexual
violence and child abuse, between the years 2008 and 2012.95 Although the petitioners
had made reports of the acts of defilement at various police stations, the officers
neglected, omitted, refused, or otherwise failed to conduct prompt, effective, and
professional investigations into the complaints.96 They also often failed to even record the
complaints in the police occurrence book, to visit the crime scenes, or to interview
witnesses.97
Fortunately for these victims, equality effect’s legal team and social workers at the
shelter in Meru documented these police failures.98 The evidence submitted with the
complaint was over 502 pages in length and detailed the specific police treatment of the
girls.99 The plaintiffs were eleven girls, ranging in age from five to fifteen years old, who
had made complaints to police stations regarding their defilement at the hand of family
members, neighbors, employers, and even a police officer.100 The evidence included an
affidavit of C.K., a five-year-old girl, who had been raped by her uncle.101 When Ripples
International had brought this incident to the attention of the police, the police had asked
for money in order to intervene.102 In another case included in the evidence, when fifteen-
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year-old F.K. became pregnant after being raped by her neighbor, the police told her that
they could not investigate her rape or arrest the perpetrator until the baby was born.103
The petition alleged that by failing to investigate the claims of these young girls,
the police had violated their rights under the Kenyan Constitution, as well as other
regional and international human rights treaties.104 These rights included: “the right to
and freedom from discrimination, the right to security of the person, and the right to
access justice.”105 The petition cited directly to the Lenahan case.106
On May 27, 2013, the High Court of Kenya ruled in the girls’ favor.107 The Court
found that the police were directly responsible for the psychological harms flowing from
the mistreatment the girls had received by the police; these harms were also found to
amount to a violation of the girls’ constitutional rights.108 The Court also noted that the
inaction by the police had rendered them indirectly responsible for the harms inflicted
upon the girls by their rapists:109
Police unlawfully, inexcusably and unjustifiably neglected, omitted and/or
otherwise failed to conduct prompt, effective, proper and professional
investigations to the said complaints. That failure caused grave harm to the
petitioners and also created a climate of impunity for defilement as perpetrators
were let free.110
The Court found that the failure to conduct these investigations violated several
provisions of national law. First, the police violated both express and implied provisions
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of Article 27 of the Kenyan Constitution,111 which guarantees the rights to equal
protection before the law and equal benefit of the law.112 Article 27 also provides:
Women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal
opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres…. The State shall
not discriminate directly or indirectly against any person on any ground, including
race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour,
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth. 113
The Court also found a violation of Article 244 of the Kenyan Constitution, which
requires that the National Police Service “strive for the highest standards of
professionalism, prevent corruption, promote accountability, “comply with constitutional
standards of human rights and… train staff to the highest possible standards of
competence and integrity….”114
Based on its holding, the Court ordered the National Police Service to conduct
thorough investigations into each of the cases.115 Furthermore, the Court ordered the
police to take the appropriate measures to implement Article 244 of the Kenyan
Constitution, which requires that police respect and comply with human rights
standards.116 Such holdings and remedies are consistent with the other cases discussed in
this article that involved state liability for failure to protect women and girls from private
citizens, such as Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras and Campo Algodonero v. Mexico,
both of which were heard by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.117
Based on the cases above in which both domestic and international courts around
the world have held that freedom from domestic violence is a basic human right and that
111
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States are responsible for diligently protecting their citizens from such violence, it is
reasonable to question how the United States could possibly be ignoring and inhibiting
this progress that is now demanded in international law.
Part V – Local Ordinances in the United States
Although the United States Supreme Court has failed to recognize that freedom
from domestic violence is a basic human right and to hold states and police accountable
for neglecting to enforce restraining orders and diligently protect their citizens, several
cities throughout the United States have stepped up and demanded justice for victims of
domestic violence by passing local ordinances on the subject. The first city to pass such a
resolution was Cincinnati, Ohio, which recognized the prevalence of domestic violence
and declared that “freedom from domestic violence is a fundamental human right” and
that “state and local governments bear a responsibility to continue securing this human
right on behalf of their citizens.”118 In 2012, Baltimore, Maryland followed suit, “FOR
the purpose of joining world leaders and leaders within the United States in recognition
of domestic violence as a human rights concern and declaring that the freedom from
domestic violence is a fundamental human right.”119
Since 2011, at least twenty-six U.S. towns and cities have passed ordinances or
resolutions declaring that domestic violence is a human rights concern and that freedom
from domestic violence is a basic human right.120 Some of these cities include Buffalo,
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New York; Miami-Dade, Florida; Miami Springs, Florida; Montgomery County,
Alabama; Seattle, Washington; Washington, D.C.; Austin, Texas; Boston, Massachusetts;
Jacksonville, Florida; and Chicago, Illinois.121 However, as no legal action has yet been
taken on the basis of these ordinances; therefore, it is still unknown what impact they will
have. In 2015 President Obama issued a proclamation affirming the “basic human right to
be free from abuse.”122 Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has taken no
action to make this near-globally accepted notion a reality in the United States.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court struck down Congress’s attempt to enact legislation on
this issue in United States v. Morrison (discussed further below).
Part VI – Solutions
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Gonzales, which Justice Ginsberg joined, argued that
although the Federal Constitution’s Due Process Clause did not create a property interest
to police protection from domestic violence,123 “federal law imposes no impediment to
the creation of such an entitlement by Colorado law.”124 The dissent made a great
analogy: If Jessica Gonzales had entered into a contract with a private security firm, that
firm would have been obliged to provide protection to her family.125 Furthermore, Ms.
Gonzales’ interest in that contract would undoubtedly constitute a “property” interest
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.126 Therefore, by entering a restraining
order to protect Ms. Gonzales, the Colorado judge created the functional government
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equivalent of such a private contract, thereby granting Ms. Gonzales entitlement to
mandatory protection by the local Colorado police; that state-created right would also
qualify as a “property” interest entitled to constitutional protection.127
Viewing a civil restraining order as a contract between the government and the
plaintiff requiring the government to do its due diligence to protect the plaintiff is a
strong alternative argument to the Supreme Court’s previous finding in DeShaney, in
which the Court held the government has no duty to protect individuals from private
violence, even where there was a clear threat.128 The issuance of the restraining order by
a judge creates a government duty of protection because it creates a property interest in
such protection.
Another possible solution would be for the United States to follow the worldwide
trend and pass a federal statute declaring that freedom from domestic violence is a basic
human right. However, Congress has attempted to pass one similar law in the past, and it
was met with mixed reactions from courts.129 The Violence Against Women Act of 1994
(VAWA), a part of the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, was passed “in
recognition of the severity of the crimes associated with domestic violence, sexual assault
and stalking.”130 The bill marked the first comprehensive federal legislative package
designed to criminalize and end violence against women.131 The VAWA included
provisions on rape and battering that focused both on prevention and victim services.132
The bill included the first federal criminal law against battering and also required that
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every state afford full faith and credit to restraining orders and orders of protection issued
anywhere in the United States.133 The passage of the VAWA caused a paradigm shift
regarding how issued of violence against women were addressed in the United States.134
Congress asserted that its power to pass this law stemmed from both the
Commerce Clause135 and the Fourteenth Amendment.136 At the time the VAWA was
being drafted, the controlling precedent regarding the Commerce Clause suggested that
“Congress had the power to regulate activities… [that] had a substantial effect on
commerce.”137 Congress believed that domestic and sexual violence qualified under this
test given the fact that domestic violence alone cost between $5 and $10 billion a year in
health care and criminal justice.138 Congress further believed that it had the power to pass
this Act under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which allows
Congress to ban state actions that it has found to be violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment.139
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Unfortunately, the Violence Against Women Act no longer provides federal
criminal relief for the victims of gender-motivated violence.140 This federal remedy,
which provided federal relief to victims of gender-based violence, was struck down as
unconstitutional in the Supreme Court case United States v. Morrison.141 The 5-4
majority rejected the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act on the
grounds that gender-based violence is itself not “economic” in nature; therefore,
Congress did not have the power to pass this Act under the Commerce Clause.142 The
majority also rejected the claim that Congress had the power to pass the Act under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that the civil rights
remedy of the Violence Against Women Act was aimed at redressing harm inflicted by
private actors, as opposed to state actions.143
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, noted, “If the allegations here are
true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide… a remedy…. But under our
federal system, that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not
by the United States.”144 On the other hand, Justice David H. Souter, dissenting, argued
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that the Violence Against Women Act contained a "mountain of data assembled by
Congress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce."145
Unfortunately, Justice Roberts’ statement has proven to be untrue in the years following
the Morrison case; students at universities across the country are filing lawsuits against
their schools for mishandling and rejecting their sexual assault claims.146
Since the Supreme Court has held that the issuance of a restraining order does not
create a “property” interest that is entitled to constitutional protection147 and that
Congress does not have the power to pass a law criminalizing gender-motivated violence
at the federal level,148 what other solutions are available to victims of domestic violence
seeking redress for the government’s failure to protect them? As stated in Part V of this
article, local cities can continue to pass ordinances and statutes declaring that freedom
from domestic violence is a basic human right. Better yet, states could pass such laws.”149
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Another solution is a federal consent decree. In 2011, the Department of Justice
investigated the Puerto Rico, New Orleans, and Maricopa County police departments,
finding that they engaged in patterns or practices of discriminatory, unconstitutional
policing, including gender-biased policing in their response to domestic and sexual
violence.150 The Justice Department entered into consent decrees with the Puerto Rico,
New Orleans, and Maricopa County police departments, requiring them to respond to and
investigate reports of domestic violence and sexual assault professionally, effectively,
and in a manner free of gender-based bias.151 Unfortunately, as the DOJ has only
investigated and entered into consent decrees with these three counties, this response is
inadequate in addressing police failures across the country.
One last solution for victims of domestic violence in the United States would be
for the U.S. to respect its international treaty obligations. As a signatory of the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man152 and a member of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights,153 the United States has an obligation to respect and
implement all decisions of the IACHR.154 In 2011, the IACHR found that the United
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States had violated the basic human rights of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) and her
daughters.155 In its decision, the IACHR also made recommendations to the United States
and required their implementation.156 These recommendations included: 1) investigation
into the deaths of Ms. Lenahan’s three daughters; 2) investigation into the failures that
took place relating to the enforcement of Ms. Lenahan’s restraining order as a guarantee
of their non-repetition; 3) reparations to Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales); 4) the adoption of
“multifaceted legislation at the federal and state levels, or to reform existing legislation,
making mandatory the enforcement of protection orders and other precautionary measure
to protect women from imminent acts of violence, and to create effective implementation
mechanisms”157 (emphasis added); and 5) to design protocols at the federal and state
levels that specify the proper procedures for the investigation by law enforcement
officials into reports of missing children in the context of a restraining order violation.158
Unfortunately, thus far, the United States has failed to fulfill its duties and
reparations imposed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:159 “[T]he US
lacks any coordinated mechanisms to communicate how its human rights commitments
and obligations should shape domestic policy…. The failure to communicate these
standards [to government actors and law enforcement] and their importance for policy
compounds the likelihood that serious violations will persist.”160 By honoring its treaty
obligations under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, its
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membership in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and by implementing
the recommendations of the IACHR, the United States would go a long way toward
ensuring the accountability of police officers and other government officials, thereby
creating greater protection against violence for women across the country.161 Women that
have been granted restraining orders by a court of law should be able to rely on police to
enforce those orders and should know that if the police fail to diligently do so, the
government will hold them accountable.162
Part VII – Conclusion
Even if the Supreme Court does not interpret the Constitution to impose an
obligation on government officials to protect citizens from known threats of violence
committed by private actors,163 international human rights law does.164 As a signatory of
many human rights treaties and as a leader in preventing and responding to gender-based
violence around the world, the United States has a duty to provide the same human rights
standard to its own citizens. Although Congress does not have the power to pass such a
law (except through constitutional amendment, which is extremely rare), U.S. obligations
under international human rights treaties must be implemented into local domestic
violence hearings and trials to ensure that courts at the local, state, and federal levels are
finding gender-based violence to be a human rights violation and that law enforcement
officials are accountable for failing to diligently prevent such violence.
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